Generation Markets Equilibrium Analysis using Residual Demands
| Authors: | Kim Jinho, Pusan National University, Korea, Republic of
Park Jong-Bae, Konkuk University, Korea, Republic of
Park Jun-Ho, Pusan National University, Korea, Republic of
Shin Joong-Rin, Konkuk University, Korea, Republic of |
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| Topic: | 6.3 Power Plants and Power Systems |
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| Session: | Power Plants and Power Systems Modelling and Control |
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| Keywords: | Nash games, Generation markets, Uniform price auctions, Equilibrium feasibility, Best response functions. |
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Abstract
In this paper, Nash equilibriums of generation markets are investigated using a game theory application for simplified competitive electricity markets. The characteristic of equilibrium states in N-company spot markets modelled by uniform pricing auctions is analyzed and a new method for obtaining Nash equilibriums of the auctions is proposed. Spot markets are assumed to be operated as uniform pricing auctions and generation companies are assumed to submit their bids into the auctions in the form of a seal-bid. The uniform pricing auctions in this analysis are formulated as non-cooperative and static games in which generation companies correspond to the players of the game. Based on the concept of residual demand, best response functions of each generation company in the N-company auctions are analytically derived.
